PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
As MARKED

BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE

REPORTS.
ANIMALS.

The Court of Appeals at Kansas City, Mo., holds in Fisher
v. Badger, 69 S. W. 26, that an owner of a house who, after
Theving
securing the screen door of his kitchen, is awakDogs
ened during the night and finds that a dog has
broken in and stolen milk, would be justified in thereupon
killing the dog. The ground of the decision is that it was necessary for the protection of property. "Because he killed the
dog after, and not while he was in the act of committing the
depredation, could make little or no difference, for it is a
well-known fact that a- thieving dog, when he has once
obtained what he is in pursuit of, will come again for the
same purpose. . . . We further hold that a thieving
dog is as much a common nuisance as .a sheep-killing dog,
and as such is not entitled to the protection of the law, for
there is no way to avoid his depredations except to kill him
unless the owner, knowing his evil propensities, restrains
him."
ASSAULT.

In Kline v. Kline, 64 N. E. 9, it appeared that an assault
was committed on a woman by pointing a pistol at her. The
tenWt Supreme Court of the state holds that this wrong
Suffering
being willful, the plaintiff was entitled to recover
full compensation for the damages sustained by her by
reason thereof, including damages for fright and mental
sufferings, though there was no physical touching of her
body and no direct physical injury. "While," says the court,
"the current of authority supports the doctrine that there can
be no recovery for mental suffering, where there has been no
physical injury in ordina-y actions for negligence, yet that
is not the law as applied to a willful injury committed against
the complaining party." See Wyman v. Leavitt, 36 American Rep. 303.
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The plaintiff, sixty-nine years old, was talking to a third
person who had hold of his arm, when the ddfendant, a man
what
thirty-five years old, weighing two hundred and
Constitutes

twenty-five pounds, came past them, seized the

third person's arm and pulled him with such force that the
plaintiff on whose arm the third person retained his hold,
was thrown and injured. "The defendant's act was friendly
and was a customary form of greeting between him and
the third person !" Under these facts the Appellate Court
of Indiana holds in Reynolds v. Pierson,64 N. E. 484, that
the defendant was guilty of a willful assault. The defendant, it is said, exhibited such a reckless disregard of consequences, as to constitute a constructive intent to assault the
plaintiff.

CARRIERS.

In Simmons v. OregonR. Co., 69 Pac. 44o, the Supreme
Court of Oregon holds that while in general the conductor
Passengers: of a freight train does not have implied authority
Essentials of
Relationship

to accept persons as passengers, yet where a railroad company allows passengers to ride on regu-

lar freight trains, but not on "extras," and a person in good
faith boards a train in fact an "extra," but in all appearances
similar to a regular freight,, and he is allowed by the conductor to ride thereon, he is to be regarded as a passenger to
whom the company is liable as a carrier for injuries received
while on such train.
The same case draws a distinction between where a railroad company is and where it is not liable to an employe
being carried by it. An employe, it is said, travelling free
as a part of his contract of service, to and from his work,
or in immediate connection with his employment, is not a
passenger, but an employe, and a fellow-servant with those
in charge of the train. But, where an employe is traveling on his own private business, when his time is his own,
even though he travels on a pass or ticket received on account
of his employment, or is permitted to travel without a pass
or ticket by reason of his employment, he is a passenger, and
not a servant. See and compare Gillshannon v. Railroad
Corp., IO Cush. 228, and Dickinson v. Railway Co., 117

Mass. 365.
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In Irwin v. Cirie, the Court of Appeals of New York
holds that where a customs broker, with the assent of his
clients, has placed their claims against the govcontingent
Fee
ernment with an attorney for collection, with an
agreement that such attorney will -divide with him the
amount of any recovery, he may maintain an action against
the attorney for his share of the proceeds, though the statute
law of New York prohibits attorneys from making such
agreements. This provision, it is held, is directed against
the attorney alone, and does not prohibit a layman from
entering into such contract. It is not improbable that the
case would be followed in other jurisdictions, but it is difficult to see how the broker should recover on the contract,
since, if it is void as to "the attorney the broker has given no
consideration; and hence his recovery should be based on
quasi-contract; but it is apparently the theory of the court
that recovery is on the contract.

CONTRACTS.

In Brown. v. Levy, 69 S. W. 255, the Court of Civil Appeal of Texas holds that where A. makes an offer to erect a
building for a certain amount, and B. accepts it,
Mise.
there is a consummated and binding contract,
though A., in adding up the items of his estimates, makes
a mistake, for which B. is not responsible, by which the total
is made $Io,ooo too small. No authorities are cited, and the
opinion upon the point is very brief. See and compare
Webster v. Cecil, 3o Beavan, 62, where upon very similar
facts a different conclusion was reached.

CONVERSION.

In South Carolina a female may, :when over twelve years
of age, make a will disposing of her personal property. The
Supreme Court of this state deals with a will
Judicial
gl
made by an infant female over twelve years of
age in Major v. Hunt, 41 S. E. 816, where part of the
estate purpgrted to be bequeathed was a fund arising from
the sale of certain real estate of the testatrix under an order
of the court. It is held that the fund so arising which had
been directed to be paid into court remained realty and did
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not pass under the will. See North v. Walk, Dud. Eq. 212.
"When land," it is said, "of an infant is sold under judicial
proceedings, the fund arising from the sale is not divested of
its character as realty, unless it appears from the 6rder directing the sale that it was the intention of the court to convert the proceeds into personalty."

CRIMINAL LAW.

In State v.-Coats;-4I S. E. 7o6, the Supreme Court of
North Carolina holds that where a grand jury examines
Incompetent the wife of the accused, but also another and
Witness
competent witness, and on the trial the latter
befr.e
only is examined, a motion in arrest of judgGrand Jury
ment of conviction is properly refused, as the
verdict has conclusively established that the incompetent
testimony before the grand jury was surplusage.
The Supreme Court of Georgia in Strickland v. State, 41
S. E. 713, holds that when, in a trial of a criminal case, after
Recalling
the jury have retired to consider the case they
Witness
return into court, and state that they are unable
to recollect the testimony on a given point, and in effect,
request information from the court, as to what was the testimony on this point, there is no error in allowing a witness
who had been sworn in the case to be recalled, and to restate
his testimony on the point in question.

DAMAGES.

The measure of damages for failure to deliver mill machinery within the time prescribed by the contract of sale is
Delay In
not the possible profits, estimated on a rising
Delivery
market, but is a fair rental value, during the time
lost by the breach of the contract, of the mill or portion
thereof which the machinery would have -equipped, which
value, if otherwise incapable of determination, may be based
on the legal rate of interest on the capital invested in the
plant and- other machinery kept idle by reason of the seller's
breach, together with losses and expenses incidental to the
delay in delivery, such as insurance, idle labor, deterioration
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in machinery, etc. Supreme Court of North Carolina in
D. A. Tompkins Co. v. Dallas Cotton Mills, 41 S. E. 938,
See also Rocky Mount. Mills v. Wilmington & W. R. Co.,
IIQ N. C. 693.

DONATIO MORTIS CAUSA.

A., in expectancy of death, delivered certain bonds to her
lawyer, instructing him to give them to certain children
,ffeftof
after her death. After the delivery had been
Will
made, the lawyer suggested that she make a will
to this effect, which she did. This will proved defective.
Under these circumstances the Supreme Court of Vermont
holds in Darling v. Emery, 52 Atl. 517, that a finding that
there was a donatio mortis causa was justified as the two
acts were not inconsistent either in fact or in law.

]VIDFNCE.

The Supreme Court of South Carolina holds in Copeland
v. Copeland,42 S. E. lo5, that in an action on a note, where
Actlon on
the defendant alleged that his -signature was a
Note
mistake, and was intended to be put on another
note, signed on the same date, such other note was admissible in evidence on behalf of the defendant.
In North Carolina the statute forbids husband and wife
to testify to "a confidential communication made by one to
Husband .nd
the other during their marriage" or to give "eviWife
dence for or against" each other in a criminal
case. Interpreting this statute, the Supreme Court of that
state holds in State v. Wiseman, 41 S. E. 884, that a husband is a competent witness for the state in the prosecution
of a third person and the wife of the witness for fornication
alleged to have been committed before their marriage, the
fact as to which he testifies having also occurred prior-thereto, and the case being non pros'd as to her. There is a
vigorous dissent on the part of one member of the court.
The similarity of the North Carolina statute to the legislation of other states and the possible results of this apparent
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departure from the usual decisions makes the case of more
than local inteiest. Compare State v. McDowell, iof N.
C. 734.

.

,

In State v. Caster, 32 Southern, 183, the Supreme Court
of Louisiana holds that a dying declaration must go in as a
Dying
whole, and is not rendered inadmissible because
Declaration
some of its statements of themselves, and if
standing alone would be admissible.

FEDERAL COURTS.

Where, in an action in a federal court a defefidant township appears, answers, resists the action, files an appeal bond
and prosecutes an appeal, the state court cannot

inquire if the federal court had jurisdiction of
the defendant, but such question can only be made by motion
in the original action in the federal court: Supreme Court
of South Carolina (one judge dissenting) in. McCullough
J

v. Hicks, 41 S. E. 761.

FRAUD.

In Tindle v. Birkett, 64 N. E.2io, it appeared that a member of a firm knowingly made false statements to a mercanRepresentatlons to

tile agency as to its financial condition in order

to obtain a favorable rating in the reference
books furnished to-the subscribers of the agency.
The Court of Appeals of New York-holds that a subscriber
who sells and delivers goods to such firm on credit, relying
solely on such rating, and without any 'further knowledge,
where the members are adjudged bankrupt on their own
petition before the goods are paid for, may maintain an
action for obtaining the goods by fraud, though the statements were made to the agency and not to the vendee personally. One judge dissents, stating as his reasons : "The
rating of a mercantile agency is merely its conclusion as to
the financial status of the person to whom it relates. In this
case the conclusion was based partly upon statements furnished by the defendant, and partly upon information derived from other sources."
Mercantile
Agency
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GIFTS.

The New York Supreme Court (Appellate Division, First
Department) holds in McGavie v. Cossum, 76 N. Y. Supp.
305, that where the owner of bonds in the -care
sy-bna
Delivery
of a bank during her last illness gave another a
writing stating that she had given him such bonds and
.actual delivery was impossible, owing to the owner's illness,
there was a good gift inter vivos. See Gifts, Vol. 24,
,Cent. Dig., § 33.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

The Appellate Court of Indiana holds in Guy v. Liberenz,
64. N. E. 527, that in an action on the joint note of a husband and wife, and to foreclose a mortgage on
J01t Note
realty held by them as tenants by entireties, and
given to secure their note, the burden was on the plaintiff
to establish affirmatively.that the wife did not sign as surety,
and that the contract was one which she was authorized to
make, there being a presumption of suretyship in such case;
hence it is held that special findings of fact which show that
she received no part of the consideration, without a finding
of the ultimate fact of suretyship, were sufficient to sustain
a conclusion of law holding the note and mbrtgage invalid
as to her. See also Potter v. Sheets, 5 Ind. App. 506.
Under the modern practice an action by a wife for personal injuries and an action by her husband for loss of
services resulting from such injuries were tried
injury to
at the same time, before the same jury, and were
Wife,
confictinz
submitted on the same evidence. A verdict was
Verdicts
returned for the wife and against the husband,
though the instructions stated that if the wife was injured
and suffered both parties were entitled to verdicts. The
judgment for the wife was affirmed on appeal. Under these
facts the New York Supreme Court (Appellate Division,
Second Department) holds in Gray v. Brooklyn Heights R.
Co., 76 N. Y. Supp. 24, that the verdict against the husband
was so irreconcilable with the verdict for the wife that a
judgment on the former verdict would be set aside, and a
new trial granted.
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ILLEGITIMATES.

The -statute law of Missouri provides that illegitimates
shall be capable of inheriting and transmitting inheritance on
the part of their mother, as if they had been lawRight to
Inherit
fully begotten of her. Construing this provision, which is similar to provisions in other states, the Supreme Court of the state holds in Moore v. Moore, 69 S. W.
278, that an illegitimate may, like a legitimate child, inherit
from a brother of his mother dying after her. Compare
Stevenson v. Sullivant, 5 Wheat. 207, where the court refuses to allow any inheritance except from the mother or
through the mother in a direct line.

INSURANCE.

In Vernon Ins. & Trust Co. v. Maitlen, 63 N. E. 755,
the Supreme Court of Indiana holds that where a fire policy
Appraisement requires, as a condition precedent to action
of Loss
thereon, that the loss be appraised by an appraiser selected by the company and one selected by the
insured and an umpire selected by the appraisers, the fact
that the appraisers, acting in good faith, cannot agree on an
umpire, is not a waiver of the condition requiring appraisement which will authorize suit without an appraisement, but
the parties must select other appraisers: See and compare
Westenhaver v. Insurance Co. 84 N. W. 717 (Iowa).
INJUNCTION.

With two judges- dissenting the Court of Appeals of New
York holds in Marlin Firearms Co. v. Shields, 64 N. E.
163, that the publication of unjust and malicious
Publicaton
criticisms of a manufactured article in a magaof Libel
zine cannot be restrained by injunction, though the manufacturer has no remedy at law because of his inability to
prove special damage.
The "right of privacy" receives a very-thorough discussion by the Court of Appeals of New York in Roberson v.
Rochester FoldingBox Co., 64 N. E. 442. The
Right of
Privacy
court holds that the so-called right of an individual, founded on the claim that he has a right to pass
through this world without having his picture taken, his
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business enterprises discussed, his successful experiments
written up for the benefit of others, or his eccentricities commented on in circulars, periodicals, or newspapers, whether
the comment be favorable or otherwise, does not exist in
law and is not enforceable in equity. Therefore the unauthorized publication of lithographic prints or copies of a photograph of a young woman as part of an advertisement of a
legitimate article cannot be enjoined where there is no allegation that the picture is libellous in any respect, but the complaint alleges that the likeness is so good that it is easily
recognized, and that it is used to attract attention to the
advertisement, although the publication has caused great
mental and physical distress to such woman, necessitating
the employment and attendance of a physician. There are
not a few reasons for regretting this decision, and three
judges dissent. Compare Pollard v. PhotographicCo., 40
Ct. Div. 345, and HarvardLaw Review, Vol. IV, p. 193.

JOINT TORT FEASORS.

In Abb v. NorthernPacific Ry. Co., 63 Pac. 954, the Supreme Court of Washington holds that tlfe person injured
Reeae of
by joint tort feasors, by releasing and dischargOne
ing from all damages done him one of the joint
tort feasors, releases the other, though the release expressly
stipulates that it shall not: See Ellis v. Bitzer, 2 Ohio, 89,
and compare Chamberlin v. Murphy, 41 Vt. 110.

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

Where one of two co-tenants in possession of leased premises surrenders possession to .the landlord who places a third
Co-.Tenants,

person in possession as sole tenant, it is an

ouster, entitling the other co-tenant to maintain
trespass quare clausum fregit against the landlord, even
though the lease is surrendered by the first co-tenant: Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Harford v. Taylor,
63 N. E. 902. See Byam v. Bickford, I4O Mass. 31.
Ouster
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The same court holds in Jordan v. Sullivan, 63 N. E.
909, that where an owner of a building let a hall for the

installation of a lodge, agreeing to light and
heat the same, and a person; in entering the
Visiting
building to attend the ceremonies, fell and was
Tenant
injured, owing to the insufficient lighting of the
entrance thereto, she could not recover for her injury from
the owner, being at most an invited guest of the lodge, and as
such having only the rights against the owner which the
lodge itself would have had, and that the lodge did not have
any right to complain that a gas jet should have been put in
to light the entrance, since it had rented the building without
such jet being in: Compare Roche v. Sawyer, 176 Mass.
71.
Liability
Persons

LrEASS.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania holds in Pershingv.
Feinberg,52 Atl. 22, that forfeiture of a lease, because rent
was not paid in time, will not be sustained where
Forfeiture,
Tender of
there was a timely tender of payment by check,
and checks had before been tendered for rent,
Rent
and while refused, had not been refused because the tender
was illegal, but for other reasons stated.

MARSHALLING OF ASSETS.

A creditor having a mortgage on real estate levied execution on the personal property of the debtor in a suit to recover the same debt, when another creditor, havSuccessive
Mortgages

ing a chattel mortgage subsequent to the levy,

procured an assignment of the judgment and real estate mortgage of the first -reditor, and released the levy,
though a third creditor had procured a second mortgage on the land. Under these facts the Supreme Court
of Iowa holds in Valley Nat. Bank v. Des Moines Nat. Bank,
90 N. - W. 342, that the mortgage to- the, third creditor
became the prior lien on the land, the creditor taking the
assignment having no right to release the e:xecution levy
and h6ld the personal property under its chattel mortgage,
and make its assigned claim out of the real estate under the
assigned mortgage.
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MASTER AND SERVANT.

Against the dissent of four judges the Court of Errors
and Appeals of New Jersey holds in Hesse v. National
Anumpti.n
Casket Co., 52 Ati. 384, that an employe, alOf Risk
though a minor, in accepting service, assumes
the risk of such dangers connected with his employment as
are obvious to him, and cannot hold his employer responsible for injuries resulting therefrom, notwithstanding the
latter has failed to point out such dangers to him. See Dunn
v. McNamee, 59 N. J. Law, 498.

MORTGAGES.

In De Lancey v. Finhegan,90 N. W. 387, the Supreme
Court of Minnesota holds that the doctrine "Once a mortpurchase of

gage always a mortgage" has no application to

a future contract between the mortgagor and
the mortgagee for the purchase of the mortgagor's right of redemption. The mortgagee may always
purchase the mortgagof's right of redemption, for a fair
consideration, if the transaction is untainted by any oppression or advantage taken of the necessities of the mortgagor.
But equity, it is said, will scan such sales with jealous care,
and require their fairness to be clearly established.
Equity of
Redemption

NAVIGABLE RIVERS.

The Supreme Cour of Missouri, discussing the rights of
riparian owners, holds in State v. Longfellow, 6 9 S. W. 374,
that the erection by a riparian owner on a fresh
Ripan
Owners
water navigable stream of a permanent building
between high and low water mark is not unlawful as a material interference with navigation.

NEGLIGENCE.

In Tremblay v. Harmony Mills, 64 N.-E. 501, the Court
of Appeals of New York holds that where the owner of a
Disciharge of
Weter on

building negligently maintained a leader from

the roof of a building so as to discharge water
on the sidewalk, by which ice accumulated thereon, and the walk became dangerous, he was liable to any person injured thereby. Three judges dissent. The majority
Sidewlk
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regard the case as falling within the principle that "At common law any act or obstruction whicb unnecessarily incommodes or impedes the lawful use of a highway by the public
is a fluisance." Compare the earlier New York case of
Wenslick v. McCotter, 87 N. Y. 12.2, which tends to support the contention of the dissenting judges.
NUISANCE.

The Supreme Court of California holds in Kleebauer v.
Western Fuse and Explosives Co., 69 Pac. 246, that a corPowder
poration keeping five thousand pounds of gunMagazine

" powder in a magazine is liable for the damages

occasioned to nearby dwellings by an employe maliciously
setting fife to the gunpowder. The ground of the decision
is that the maintenance of the magazine is a nuisance. The
court refers among other cases to the celebrated case of
Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 H. L. Cas. 33o , and also to Heeg v.
Licht, 8o N. Y. 581, but no case seems to go as far as this
one where the loss is occasioned by the immediate voluntary
and malicious interference of a third person. It may be
questioned whether the maintenance of the nuisance is the
proximate cause and not rather the act of the third party.
PARENT AND CHILD.

In Harrisv. State, 41 S. E. 983, the Supreme Court of
Georgia holds that a mother who has the right to control
Assault on
and correct her child may authorize another in
Child
her presence to chastise the child for disobedience, and if he do so in a proper manner, he is not guilty of
an assault and battery upon the child. just how far
parental authority may be delegated is not discussed.
PARTNERSHIP.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania holds in Duffy v.
Gilmore, 51 Atl. 1026, that an agreement between A. and B.
in forming a partnership, B. coritributing the
Usury,
Share of
greater amount of capital, that at the end of each
Profits,
year A. shall pay to B. 1O per cent interest on
the difference in the capital is -not usurious, but is merely an
arrangement regulating the sharing of the profits. Scott v.
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Kennedy, 51 Atl. 384, is cited in which it was said:.
"Whether the sum to be paid was fixed in advance or left to
be determined by a fixed percentage is unimportant, as long
as it was a share of the profits only.'"
Where all the partners entitled to use the firm name die or
retire without assigning the right to use the firm name, such
right dies and does not pass to -the personal repDeath of
Partners,
resentatives of the last survivor: New York SuFinm Name
preme Court (Special Term, New York County)
in Fisk v. Fisk, 76 N. Y. Supp. 482. The personal representatives of the last survivor of a firm are not entitled to an
injunction to prevent the use of the firm name as a designation for a corporation About to engage in a similar business,
where there would be no competition by the corporation with
the settlement of the estate of the last survivor.
RAILROADS.

A woman with her children purchased tickets and boarded
a train to go to a certain "crossing" where there was no
station. The train was a long freight train
Taking
Passenger with a passenger coach in the rear. The conbeyond
ductor was unable to communicate the signal to
Destination
the engineer in time to stop at their destination,
and stopped at another crossing three-quarters of a mile
beyond, where he assisted them to alight. A. shower had
come up, and it was raining when they got off the train and
they were wet when they reached a farm residence nearby.
The woman was not put to any extra expense and would
have been wet if let off at her destination. The Supreme
Court of North Carolina holds that a judgment of nonsuit
was properly ordered: Smith v. Wilmington & W. R. Co.,
41 S. E. 481. The court cites no authority for this position, and there is a strong dissent by two of the justices.
In People v. Feitner,63 N. E. 786, the Court of Appeals
of New York holds that where one domestic railroad corporation leases the properties and franchises of
Taxation
another for the entire life of the lessor's charter
and renewals thereof, the lessee acquires merely a lessee's
interest, with the right to use the leased properties upon payment of the rentals reserved, and is not taxable as the owner
of such properties. In assessing the lessee, the value of
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the leases, exclusive of the right to use the leased franchises,
should be ascertained, and added to the value of the real
estate and personal property of the lessee, deducting from
this total whatever deductions are allowed by statute.

RIFORMATION OF INSTRUMENTS.

The Supreme Court of Iowa holds in Hausbrandt v.
Hofler, 90 N. W. 494, that where the parties to a demand
note execute it through the mistaken underEvidence to
Vary Contract

standing that it only operates as a receipt for an

advancement from the payee to his daughter, who is the
maker's wife, the note will be reformed in equity to conform to the intention of the parties in an action on the note,
and that parol evidence that the note was so intended as a
receipt is admissible in the action in which the reformation
of the note so sought.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

Where in a contract for the sale of land difficulty arises
in consequence of the absence of the memorandum required
Sale of Land,

Part
Performance

by the Statute of Frauds it is usually the vendee

who seeks to secure specific performance of the

contract on equitable grounds of part perform-

ance, etc. But in Johnson v. Puget Mill Co., 68 Pac. 867, it
is the vendor who wishes to.resist a repudiation of the contract by the vendee, and the Supreme Court of Washington
holds that there having been a part performance of an oral
contract for the sale of land, so as to enable the vendee to
enforce it in equity, he cannot repudiate it, and recover, as
for money had and received, payments made; she not having
offered to make remaining payments and the vendor being
ready and able to perform: See Ketchum v. Evertson, 13
Johns. 359-364.

